Introduction
In July 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron's government introduced its new Future Reserves 2020: Valuable and Valued (FR2020) policy, which aimed to increase the capability and deployability of Britain's reserve forces.
1 Although FR2020 was a defencewide policy that addressed all three services' reserve forces, most of the policy focused on transforming the Territorial Army (TA), which was to receive £1.2 billion investment
[of the initial £1.5 billion allocated to implement FR2020 across the three services] to expand, train and equip the organisation so that it could deploy alongside the Regular
Army. The policy represented the most radical attempt to transform the TA since its inception in 1907, aiming to change it from a strategic reserve to a routinely deployable operational force. The complimentary Army2020 policy sought to integrate the Reserves and Regulars within a single, tiered rotational force structure. FR2020 put the previously marginal TA at the core of British defence during Cameron's tenure, ensuring it received heavy political and media attention. Despite its importance to British defence policy, the origins and effects of FR2020 have been understudied.
This article examines why and how the recent attempt to transform the TA was undertaken, and analyses its outcome. It details how the key drivers for restructuring the TA were intensely political, ideological and financial. Challenging Edmunds et al.'s view that 'the most important long-term driver for change [in the Reserves was] strategic in nature', it argues that these rationales underpinning FR2020's origins -and the Army's resistance to them -are crucial to understanding the policy's evolution and impact. 2 Our analysis reveals how these ideological and financial dynamics resulted in an ad hoc defence policy and subsequent intra-service and civil-military frictions, providing further evidence of incoherent defence policy-making during Cameron's tenure. Thus, we make three important contributions to the military innovation literature, whilst increasing understanding of reserve forces amongst international security scholars.
First, we provide original data on a recent attempt at peacetime reserve force innovation: themes understudied in the military innovation literature. Specifically, the literature identifying intra-service rivalry as the driver of innovation has previously focused on competition between different arms. However, our case provides a compelling example of intra-service rivalry between components rather than arms, and over personnel and organisational structures rather than technology and visions of victory.
Second, we explore how Cameron's domestic, intra-party ideological and financial motivations led his government to pressure the Army to execute organisational reforms in order to address primarily domestic, rather than external, factors. This analysis also exposes how the Army's leadership was able, towards the end of Cameron's tenure, to extricate itself from these innovation efforts in order to maintain its pre-eminence vis-à-vis the TA. We show how the Army's leadership reasserted its primacy once the political will for implementing FR2020 diminished. We show that several processes identified in the innovation literature were simultaneously operant highlighting the inherent organisational realities of reserve service that can limit innovation efforts.
Finally, addressing the broader lack of sociological theory in military innovation studies,
we employ industrial sociology to show how FR2020 followed post-Fordist principles to meet these political, ideological and financial demands. Taken together, this article contributes a major new case study to the literature on peacetime innovation, and the impact of intra-party and intra-service politics upon it, within the wider context of a postFordist understanding of the reorganisation of military forces.
Our evidence is drawn from an ESRC-funded, Army-sponsored research project conducted between 2012 and 2016 that examined FR2020's origins, evolution and impact. The research was mixed methods, utilising elite interviews with senior policy makers to understand FR2020's origins and evolution, and interviews, surveys and field observations of units to understand its impact. The data presented here draws on 16 elite interviews from the across the Army, the Reserves, government, and former ministers, and supporting doctrinal and primary and secondary source analysis. To mitigate any evidential risks from these sources, interview, primary and secondary source data has been triangulated to ensure validity.
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The Politics of Military Innovation
Here we overview the military innovation literature to establish a conceptual framework to investigate FR2020. This literature can be divided into two main schools of thought.
The top-down approach focuses on the importance of doctrine, civil-military relations and inter-and intra-service politics as drivers of innovation. 4 However, more recently several scholars have argued that militaries can also transform in response to bottom-up -or tactical -pressures. 5 Farrell later defined these processes as 'top-down innovation' mode of production that relied on mass labour forces 'employed on long term contracts, producing standardised products for stable markets', which began to be undermined in the 1970s by rising production costs and competition.
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Drawing on industrial sociology, King notes how, driven by the pressures of decreasing military budgets and increasingly diverse missions, Western militaries have adopted postFordist principles to deliver better efficiencies. He applies the four tenets of post-Fordism to the military environment: 1) the replacement of mass labour with a highly skilled core (professional and special forces) and less-skilled periphery (reserve forces); 2) the outsourcing of non-core functions to reduce overheads; 3) the centralisation of headquarters and the flattening of hierarchies; and 4) the development of a network approach to supply, knowledge and organisational structure (e.g., the dispersal and cocoordination of forces centred around independent brigades). Afghanistan. They show how the economic climate in which the reviews were conducted dictated that financial security was the foundation upon which the SDSR rested. They question this contention given the ability of nations to access international lending facilities; in reality the SDSR was 'politics-led' and a product of the Conservatives' ideological views on the economy. 32 Senior officers required to implement subsequent defence cuts have stated that despite the austerity rhetoric, these cuts were ultimately 'a political choice'. 33 As both the NSS and SDSR were undertaken simultaneously with the 2010 Spending Review, and completed in only five months, some labelled the SDSR 'a treasury-led defence review', indicating the rushed and ad hoc nature of policy formulation at the time. 34 The evidence presented below further supports this. Yet, this politico-ideological context for FR2020 was also influenced by intra-party and intraservice dynamics.
Background to FR2020
While the TA's recent history can be traced back to the 1860s, analysis of the three major periods of reserve transformation reveals that Britain's reserve army has proved difficult to reform historically and failed to provide an effective system for deployment overseas outside wars of national survival. 35 The TA and its predecessors have been a strategic, rather than operational, reserve. The current transformation's origins begin with the 1990
Options for Change defence review that reduced the TA's establishment from 76,000 to 63,500. This reduction created structural problems within the TA and failed to define its role. The lack of a collective role meant that the 'system of individual backfills was introduced which would last for the next 20 years'. 36 the Tory backbench and the Reserves was a way of doing it'. 64 Other senior officers and a former defence minister have confirmed that FR2020's creation was motivated by intraparty political and ideological, rather than military/strategic, rationales. 65 These external, ideological and intra-party political drivers are crucial to understanding FR2020's subsequent evolution. They not only created tensions between Conservative backbenchers and ministers, and between government politicians and the Army, but also between senior officers in the TA and the Army, impacting FR2020's development at every stage. Most significantly, FR2020's political origins created dissonance between its vision for, and the reality of, organisational transformation.
An Independent Reserves Commission?
Following the SDSR's publication, Cameron decided that an independent commission would be established to examine the Reserves. Lamb has recounted the ad hoc development of this policy decision: This would cause further problems.
As FR2020 progressed, the difficult organisational reality of deploying Reserve sub-units with Regulars became clearer. Supporting Edmunds' arguments about the increasing prominence of risk management in British civil-military relations, the training differential between regulars and reservists meant that the legal responsibility to ensure reservists were 'accredited, regulated and subject to legislation', underpinned any ability to deploy them. 80 Although cultural suspicion and institutional rivalry played a part, the Army argued that there were huge legal implications of deploying Reserve units to conflicts alongside Regulars without providing them similar levels of training. Integrated collective training, therefore, became central to sub-unit operational capability.
Meanwhile, it became apparent that outsourcing logistics capability to Reserve units would require an immense re-organisation and would take much longer than the FR2020 timeline envisaged. Thus, the realities of reserve service constrained FR2020 from the outset, highlighting how the organisation struggled to adapt to meet FR2020's demands. It highlighted that implementing FR2020 would not be as straightforward as envisaged by government.
The Politics of Numbers
With a new role defined, the requirement to grow AR numbers gained centre- . 85 Richards also notes that
Houghton had outlined to the NSC that FR2020 needed testing to prove its practicability, but that 'the government decided to push it through without this sensible precaution'.
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This echoes Wall's opinion that the Reserves' expansion was 'not grounded in military experience, military fact, or any credible evidence… it was a finger in the wind thing' exercise and Dannatt's viewpoint that it 'was based on hope rather than any science'.
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Thus, the intensely political nature of FR2020 and subsequent intra-service rivalry ensured it continued to be an externally-driven process, which the Army did not fully support.
Cameron's hope that the White Paper would settle the Reserves issue was frustrated. Within a month of its publication -and despite a £3 million investment in a new recruitment campaign -leaked Army reports highlighted that the AR's strength had dropped 5% and that recruitment was 50% below target. criticism. Rumours abounded that the Army wanted FR2020 to fail. A regular officer involved with Army2020 planning confirmed that elements in the Army did want the plan to collapse, believing that if it failed the political will for cutting the Regulars would evaporate. 88 The fact that Army reports detailing reserve recruitment problems were leaked to the media supports this assertion. 89 FR2020 was becoming an intra-service struggle for survival.
As 2013 progressed, the media recognised that the cornerstone of the 
Revision and the War Fighting Division
With the political heavyweights divested of FR2020, the numbers game contributed to the beginning of its re-assessment. Nevertheless, the reality is rather more nuanced, and the 2015 SDSR is crucial to understanding Carter's position. The 2015 NSS and SDSR differed markedly from their predecessors. Crucially, the strategic threat from international near-peer conflict was reprioritised, thus, requiring organisational changes. The SDSR stated that the Army would be expected to deploy a 'war-fighting division optimised for high intensity combat operations' rather than the contingency brigade structure outlined in Army2020. 101 To
Carter, this strategic re-orientation enabled the Army to change its planning assumptions.
The SDSR's focus on the quickly-deployable warfighting division meant that the experienced, the changing strategic environment, and supported by changes in the AR narrative. By January 2018, the AR's trained strength had improved to 27,070, but this 
Conclusion: An ideological, intra-party, intra-service driven innovation
The ideological rationale of decreased state spending, and intra-party Regular-Reserve politics, not strategy, were the primary drivers of FR2020. These ideological motives, control over his nascent government. These motives fused the political goal of reinvigorating the Reserves with financial arguments about the need for cheaper forces.
Intra-party politics and the Conservatives' cost-cutting ideology drove the development of an opportunistic FR2020 plan that was portrayed as fair recompense for the drastic Army cuts. This opportunism caused FR2020 to develop in an untested manner that caused severe organisational frictions. Most controversially, these manifested in the inability to recruit the numbers required to expand the AR and, thus, its failure to meet its newly defined role.
These politically expedient decisions to transform the Reserves echo Kier, who has argued that 'civilian policymakers endorse certain military policies that they believe will ensure the maintenance of the preferred domestic distribution of power' (original emphasis). 106 As shown, Cameron's concerns over the power balance within his own party led him to initiate FR2020. Therefore, this study contributes a more nuanced intraparty political understanding of the external origins of military innovation. In relation to
Rosen's argument that conflict between combat arms drives innovation, we have provided evidence of how this can also happen between service components, and how, within the climate of austerity, conflicts over resourcing, especially relating to funding and personnel numbers, influenced the way in which the Army leadership responded to FR2020 with a zero-sum game mentality. 107 Intra-service rivalry, combined with a lack of policy coherence, undermined FR2020 from the outset. process. As Zisk argues, the process of alliance-building between interest groups within the military organisation, and supportive civilian leaders and defence policy experts can lead to innovation that benefits such groups. 109 As explored in this article, the coalition between zealous TA-supporting Tory backbenchers and serving senior TA officers, and the Policy Exchange report's recommendations, led Cameron to initiate the augmentation and transformation of the Reserves. However, as we have shown, whilst intra-party politics can initially drive innovation as intra-service rivalry and organisational difficulties adapting curtail it later, the political will to carry through to completion AR transformation waned. It was an awareness of the weakening political appetite for FR2020, aided by the changed strategic emphasis of the 2015 SDSR, that allowed the Army to re-focus its 'core business' on the warfighting division and extricate itself from with solutions to address ideologically-imposed cuts, but also created organisational challenges for the AR. However, Army2020's placing of core and periphery forces on tiered readiness cycles, and Army2020 Refine's emphasis on the warfighting division also had clear political benefits for the Army. By locking units into a deployment, recovery and training cycle, it becomes more difficult to reduce the Army any further without threatening the coherence of the system.
Thus, Army2020, and Refine, can be viewed as the Army's insurance against further defence cuts. They are not only a solution to growing financial and strategic pressures, but also a buffer against politicians' desires, and ability, to further cut the Army. Such a political view of British force structure is perhaps even more applicable to FR2020, with its attempt to integrate sub-units into the Army's readiness cycle. At a considerable political and economic cost, FR2020 has all but guaranteed the AR's survival. Indeed, FR2020's primary aim -that of reinvigorating the Reserves -has arguably already been met. Nonetheless, with the AR continuing to suffer ongoing recruitment and retention challenges and the retreat from routine deployments, it remains doubtful that FR2020 will deliver the military capability it originally envisaged. This fact alone underscores the most important drivers of this partial military innovation: politics, ideology and finance rather than military necessity.
